A Critique of Hausman’s Interpretation of Revealed Preference Theory by Berneman, Nicolás
A Critique of Hausman’s Interpretation of 
Revealed Preference Theory  
 
 




Recibido: 15 de Julio de 2016  Aceptado: 10 de noviembre de 2016 
 
Abstract: The main purpose of the essay is to criticize Hausman’s characterization of the 
economic notion of preference, which he referred to as “preference*”. My main objection is 
that it is misleading to define preference* according to only two elements: preference and 
belief. Instead, I will argue that even if we were able to assume belief as given, choices 
would still not reveal preference. Therefore, although it might be true that both belief and 
preferences are necessary for choices, I will argue that they are not sufficient as conditions. 
First, I will argue that efficacy should also be included as another element of the set 
preferences*. Then I will propose that, even if including efficacy, it could be misguided to 
conclude that we have reached a complete definition of preference*. Finally, I will suggest 
that there could exist a misunderstanding around the notion of belief.    
Keywords: Revealed Preference Theory, Hausman, Belief, Preference, Efficacy. 
 
Resumen: Este trabajo tiene por objetivo principal criticar la caracterización de la noción 
económica de preferencia realizada por Hausman, la cuál denomina “preferencia*”. Mi 
principal objeción es que es equivocado definir preferencia* como un conjunto que 
contiene sólo dos elementos: preferencia y creencia. Contrario a eso, voy a argumentar que 
incluso en el caso que pudiésemos asumir las creencias cómo dadas, las elecciones aún no 
revelarían las preferencias. Por lo tanto, aunque puede ser cierto que tanto creencia como 
preferencia son elementos necesarios en las elecciones, voy a argumentar que no son 
suficientes. Primero, voy a exponer que la eficacia también deber ser incluida como otro 
elemento del conjunto preferencias*. Segundo, voy a proponer que incluso agregando 
eficacia podría ser erróneo concluir que hemos alcanzado una caracterización completa de 
preferencia*. Finalmente, sugeriré que puede estar habiendo un malentendido acerca de la 
noción de creencia. 










Daniel Hausman (2000) claims that the notion of “revealed preference” is 
unclear and should be abandoned. The revelation theorem holds that if C(s) 
is the set of alternatives the agent chooses from s, and R is the weak 
preference relation, then choices reveal preferences. For instance, if s={a,b} 
and an agent chooses a (C(a)), then the revelation theorem holds that the 
agents prefer a over b (aRb). Against the revelation theorem Hausman 
argues that it is not true that choices reveal preferences. 
Hausman’s main objection to this theorem is to reject the interpretation of R 
as weak subjective preference. He argues that what economists call 
preference is a technical concept (which he terms “preference*”) that differs 
from the actual (psychological meaning of) preference. However, he suggests 
that preference* does also include this folk psychology notion of preference 
though not exclusively. According to Hausman, preference* entails both 
preference and belief. Therefore, he claims that “within folk psychology, one 
cannot infer preferences from choices alone, because choices depend on 
both belief and preference […]” and therefore “it is only preference (not 
preferences*) that combines with belief to determine choice” (Hausman 
2000, 103/6). Using symbolic notation, Hausman claims that C(s) cannot 
reveal preferences because R does not mean p (folk psychology notion of 
preference) but P* (economics technical notion of preference) where P* = {p, 
b}, and b means belief. 
In the essay, I will critically analyze Hausman’s concepts of preference and 
preference*. In particular, I will discuss Hausman characterization of P*. I 
will argue that even if we assume belief as a given, choices may still not 
reveal preference. For instance, it would be possible to have both belief and 
preference for a specific choice but not be “efficacious” in achieving it 
(Davidson, 1974, p. 232). In that sense, we will claim that preference and 
belief are not enough to characterize preference*, but rather efficacy should 
be included as well. Moreover, given the difficulty of finding the necessary 
and sufficient conditions to connect reason and action, I will suggest that it 
may not be possible to reach a full characterization of preference* in folk 
psychology terms. 
 
Hausman: Preference vs. Preference* 
Hausman (2000) argues that “revealed preference” theory is unclear and 
should be abandoned because it is based on a misleading interpretation of 
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the revelation theorem. As we have mentioned, revealed preference theory 
establishes that it is possible to uncover agents’ preferences by observing 
their choices. In this sense, revealed preference has been a significant 
advance within economics since it has made it possible for economists to 
dispense with the folk psychology notion of preference. Instead of referring 
to unobservable mental entities, economics could proceed on the basis of 
observable choices.  
In this framework, the central criticism of Hausman is with regard to the 
economic interpretation of R. Since R is usually taken as a weak (subjective) 
preference, Hausman focuses his objection on the way that economists 
understand the notion of preference. Although Hausman claims that choices 
do not reveal preference but preference* -an economical technical concept-, 
he argues that as soon as economists refer to utility and subject 
probabilities, preference* cannot been completely detached from the folk 
psychology conception of preference. Therefore, whatever preference* 
unerringly means, it must contain the notion of preference. 
“Those economists who want to explain or predict preferences* in terms of 
agents' utilities and subjective probability judgments cannot dispense with the 
notion of preference. For it is only preference (not preference*) that combines 
with belief to determine choice. Furthermore, if one eschews all talk of 
preference (or psychological cognates such as desire), then claims about 
beliefs or subjective probabilities are untestable and consequently scientifically 
illegitimate.” (Hausman 2000, 106) 
Hence, Hausman’s main claim is precisely that choices cannot reveal 
preference because choices depend on both preference and belief. For 
example, to explain why an investor purchases one stock rather than 
another, we need to know not just her preferences (larger returns), but also 
her beliefs (returns A will be higher the returns B). Indeed, the same 
preferences with other sets of belief could lead to a different choice. Pushed 
to the extreme, given the right set of beliefs, any set of choices is consistent 
with any set of preferences. Consequently, it is evident that one cannot infer 
preferences from choices without premises concerning beliefs. Following 
with the symbolic notation, Hausman criticizes that C(s) does not reveal P 
(folk psychology notion of preference) but P* (economics technical notion of 
preference) where P* = {p, b}. Hence, since C(s) is the only source of 
evidence, we are not able to infer which combination of p & b led to it. 
An important implication of Hausman argumentation is that if we were able 
to know the agent’s belief, then their choices would effectively reveal 
preferences. Basically, it is because preference* contains only two elements: 
preference and belief. Therefore, if choices reveals preference*, by assuming 




we know either preference or belief we are able to infer one from the other. 1 
In this sense, Hausman agrees that choices reveal preferences in the cases 
where beliefs are taken as given -- or reveal beliefs in the cases where we 
know the agents’ preference. Consequently, Hausman’s objection in these 
circumstances is that they are not the relevant class of revelation in 
economics: 
“If one takes beliefs as given, there is relatively little difficulty in taking choice 
to “reveal” preference. But this fact is of no comfort to the revealed-preference 
theorist, because this is not the relevant sort of revelation. This revelation is 
uncontroversial and fully consistent with folk psychology. It does not support 
the claim that choice defines preference.” (Hausman 2000, 104) 
This paragraph confirms Hausman’s characterization of Preference* as 
preference and belief (P* = {p, b}). This is precisely the account that I will 
criticize in the following section. 
 
Preference* is More than Preference and Belief  
In this section I will develop the main criticism to Hausman’s 
characterization of preference*, which is that it is misleading to characterize 
preference* according to only two elements. In order to demonstrate that 
even if we were able to assume beliefs as a given, choices would still not 
reveal preferences, we will take the example of the investor who is deciding 
which stock (s𝑎  or s𝑏) to buy.  
Suppose that s𝑎  is composed of diversified agricultural ETFs that invest in 
soybeans while option s𝑏  is a US mutual fund. Let´s also assume that both s𝑎  
and s𝑏  share the same level of uncertainty (or risk). We will maintain, then, 
that it could be the case that an investor who believe that 𝑅𝑒(𝑠𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠) >
𝑅𝑒(𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠) and who prefers larger returns, ends up nevertheless 
buying mutual funds. For these cases, where the choices do not reflect 
preference and belief, we maintain that beliefs and preferences were not 
efficacious in causing the choice. For instance, it could be the case that the 
investor actually had the intention to buy the soybeans but failed simply 
because of some (their own, third-party, or system) mistake and therefore 
she finally finished buying mutual funds. Also, it could be the case that, 
although during reflection the investor decided to buy the soybeans, but at 
the moment to make a choice an emotion – rather than deliberation – drove 
                                                        
1 It can be easily seen through our symbolic notation. Since C(s) does not reveal P but P*, where P*= 
{p, b}; if b were fixed, then we could infer p from P*. [𝐶(𝑠)
      𝑟𝑣𝑙       
      𝑃∗
       𝑏       
     𝑝]. 
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her behavior.2 Both cases – mistakes and emotions – seem to be relevant; 
however, for the purposes of the essay, I will interpret both of them as 
instantiations of efficacy problems.  
We might think that preference and belief generate an intention to make a 
choice, and then the efficacy is needed in order to finally perform it. In this 
sense, efficacy would connect intentions with actions. So defined, efficacy 
would contains different reasons why choice is not only the consequence of 
the preference and belief – last paragraph we have referred to mistakes and 
emotions.  Whatever, it is enough to show that Hausman’s characterization 
of preference* is misleading. In both of the cases that we have mentioned, if 
we had known the investor’s belief -𝑅𝑒(𝑠𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠) > 𝑅𝑒 𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 - 
and had observed her choice -mutual funds-, we would erroneously infer 
that the investor prefers lower returns.3  
What follows from the examples is that it is not true that knowing belief 
allows choices to reveal preferences, nor does knowing preference imply that 
choices reveal belief. The reason is simple: Preference* - or what choices 
reveal - cannot be reduced to preference and belief. Following this 
argumentation, at minimum, we must include efficacy. Following with 
symbolic notation, we have claimed that it is misguided to define P*= {p, b}; 
instead, we propose to characterize it as P*/ P*= {p, b, e, …} where the new 
element E means efficacy.4 
Davidson (1974) also remarks on the difficulty in defining a clear causal 
connection from desire and belief with actions; indeed, going further, he 
states that it is extremely difficult (if at all possible) to define the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for actions.   
“A desire and a belief of the right sort may explain an action, but not 
necessarily. A man might have good reasons for killing his father, and he 
might do it, and yet the reasons not be his reasons in doing it (think of 
Oedipus). So when we offer the fact of the desire and belief in explanation, we 
imply not only that the agent had the desire and belief, but that they were 
efficacious in producing the action. […] Can we somehow give conditions that 
are not only necessary, but also sufficient, for an action to be intentional, using 
only such concepts as those of belief, desire and cause? I think not.” (Davidson 
                                                        
2 “Neuroscience strongly suggests that often emotion (or affect) rather than deliberation (or ‘‘cool 
cognition’’) is primary in driving behavior.” (Vromen, 2011, p. 269) 
3 The same mistake would be made if, by knowing investor´s preference for larger returns and 
observing her choice of mutual bonds, we would infer the investor’s belief as 𝑅𝑒(𝑠𝑜𝑦𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠) <
𝑅𝑒(𝑚𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠). 
4 An important clarification: it is misguided to characterize preference* as a combination of 
preference and belief as long as we intend to interpret (at least one of) these elements in terms of 
folk psychology. As we have seen, Hausman states that it would be flawed not to refer to preference 
at all. Therefore, I am assuming that at least one of the elements inside preference must refer to folk 
psychology notion of preference. 




1974, 232. Italics in original). 
Accordingly, our objection does not mean that by adding efficacy, we have 
reached a complete characterization of preference*. We have just 
established that belief and preference are not sufficient elements. 
Furthermore, we suggest that, as long as preference* includes an element 
from folk psychology, it would be sincerely problematic to characterize 
preference* as a closed set. Therefore, we have showed that Hausman’s 
description of preference* -- as a closed set of belief and preference -- is 
mistaken, and should be abandoned. 
 
On the Definition of Belief 
A possible refutation of our criticism would be to argue that there is a 
problem in what we define as investor’s belief. In fact, if the investor actually 
has believed that -- given the same level of uncertainty -- Re(s𝑎) > R
e(s𝑏) 
and she had also preferred larger returns, then she would have chosen s𝑎 . 
Hence, if preferring larger returns she chose s𝑏 , it was because her belief was 
not Re(s𝑎) > R
e(s𝑏) but R
e(s𝑎) < R
e(s𝑏). From this perspective, what we call 
a mistake is not actually a mistake, but it is a way to show the true belief of 
the investor. In the same way, when we make reference to emotion 
interfering in the investor´s choice, it could also hold that emotions indeed 
reveal authentic belief as well.5  
If it were the answer, then we could argue that there is a problem with the 
meaning of belief. Throughout his work, Hausman refers to beliefs as 
subjective probabilities. But if Hausman would now claim that preferring 
larger returns and choosing A means that the true belief is 𝑅𝑒(s𝑎) > 𝑅
𝑒(s𝑏), 
then we should conclude that (1) subjective probabilities do not necessarily 
reflect the agent´s beliefs and (2) it is not possible to identify agent´s beliefs 
before observing her choices. Consequently, if it were the case, we would not 
be able to assume belief as given; hence, there would be no place for choices 
to reveal preferences because both belief and preferences could just be 
inferred after observing choices -- a posteriori. 
Different interpretations of preference* have thus emerged. On the one 
hand, we could maintain that subjective probabilities are a good 
                                                        
5 In the same way, it could be claimed that if believing Re (s𝑎) > R
e(s𝑏) she chose s𝑏 , it was not true 
that the investor authentically preferred larger returns. If it were the case, then we should discuss 
how to understand preference. Nevertheless, as we have settled that we understand preference not 
as mere residue of choices but as a mental state in psychology terms, along this section we will 
assume that we truly know that the investor actually prefer larger returns, and thus we will focus on 
the problem of how to understand belief. 
Filosofía de la Economía, 2016, Vol. 5, pp. 77-85 
83 
 
understanding of an agent´s belief, and therefore incorporate efficacy as a 
new element of preference*. Hence, in symbolic notation, the first possibility 
is to characterize preference* such P*= {p, b, e, …}, where b can be 
understood as subjective probabilities (sp). On the other hand, we could say 
that it is correct to characterize preference* as preference and belief, but 
imprecise to describe beliefs as subjective probabilities. In this second case, 
we could consider efficacy as somehow forming part of belief. Thus, the 
second option would be to describe P*/ P*= {p, B} where B includes 
subjective probabilities, efficacy and so on (B={sp, e, …}). 
Of course these cases are not exclusive, so we could also consider a third 
interpretation of preference* which include efficacy as a new element and 
belief as different of subject probability. For instance, some behavioral 
economists like Kanheman & Tversky (1979) suggest that when making 
decisions, rather than subjective probabilities, individuals actually take into 
account decision weights. This distinction seems to be relevant at least in 
two sense: first, decision weights not always reflects perceived subjective 
probability; second, decision weights are just inferred from chooses and thus 
there is not place to take them as given independently from chooses. Indeed, 
avoiding the conceptual problems that accompany folk psychology terms, 
the authors argue that decision weights should not be interpreted in terms 
of belief.6 Hence, the third option would be to characterize P*/P*= {p, b, e, 
…} where b may differ from subject probability but does not include E. 
Consequently, we have characterized preference* in three different ways: (1) 
P*= {p, b, e, …}, where b=sp; (2) P*= {p, B} with B={sp, e, …}; and (3) P*= {p, 
b, e, …}, where b≠sp. All of them substantially differ from Hausman’s 
account. However, since belief might not necessarily be described as subject 
probability (Kanheman & Tversky 1979, Weber 1994) first option is 
unconvincing. Similarly, since it is farfetched to include efficacy as part of 
agents’ beliefs, second alternative is rather implausible. Consequently, we 
suggest the third interpretation -which includes efficacy as a new element of 
an open set and does not conceive belief as equivalent to subject probability- 
as the most reasonable one. 
 
Conclusion 
We have analyzed Hausman’s interpretation of “revealed preference” 
theorem. In particular, we have discussed his characterization of preference* 
                                                        
6 “Decision weights are inferred from choices between prospects much as subjective probabilities 
are inferred from preferences in the Ramsey-Savage approach. However, decision weights are not 
probabilities: they do not obey the probability axioms and they should not be interpreted as 
measures of degree or belief.”  (Kanheman & Tversky 1979, 280) 




as a combination of only belief and preference. First, we have shown that 
even if we assumed belief as a given, choice may still not reveal preference 
(nor when assuming preference as a given does choice reveal beliefs). 
Secondly, we have argued that efficacy is also required as another element to 
describe preference*. Third, we have suggested it is still extremely difficult 
(if at all possible) to find conditions sufficient to characterize preference* 
with folk psychology terms.  
Finally, we have considered a possible response to our criticism. In doing so, 
we have considered that there is a problem with the definition of belief. We 
have pointed out that as long as we consider that, given belief, choice reveals 
preference, then we should conclude that belief may contain not just 
subjective probabilities but also efficacy. Instead, if we understand belief as 
subjective probabilities – as Hausman does – then we should include 
efficiency as a new element of preference*. However, we could include 
efficacy as a new element of preference* even when we consider that belief 
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